We introduce endogenous probability of survival in the Keynes-Ramsey optimal growth model. An individual's probability of survival is assumed to be dependent on past levels of consumption. Endogenous probability of survival implies that the rate of time preference (or degree of patience) of an individual is endogenously determined. We solve the dynamic optimization problem facing an agent and provide a complete characterization of the steady states and their stability properties. We find that with endogenous rate of time preference an economy may have multiple steady state equilibria. The equilibrium an economy converges to depends on its initial conditions. The results are interpreted in light of the growth experiences of developing economies. The model can explain why two economies that have identical production technologies and identical preferences may converge to different levels of income depending on initial conditions. We estimate the relationship between adult probability of survival and lagged consumption for a cross section of countries. Our estimation results and subsequent simulations of the model suggest that if we interpret capital in our model broadly to include both physical and human capital, poverty traps are empirically plausible.
Introduction
The consumption-saving choices of economic agents are driven by inter-temporal utility trade-o¤s between current and future consumption. Any inter-temporal decision making process can be broken down into basically two components: First, the rate of time preference, i.e., how much importance agents give to the future, and second, the rate of return on savings, i.e., the reward for foregoing current consumption. Economic theory predicts that individuals who give more importance to future would defer consumption of a larger portion their current income to future. The consumption foregone can be utilized for investment in a productive activity which would increase consumption possibilities in future.
The neoclassical model of growth (Solow(1956) , Ramsey(1928) ), which is also the benchmark model for analyzing growth related issues focuses on the second aspect of this economic decision making process. According to these models, when an economy is poor, that is, it has very little capital to work with, the rate of return on investment is very high. This induces people to save and invest more, and the economy embarks on the process of growth and development. As societies accumulate more capital the return on investment declines and hence people become less thrifty. The process of accumulation of capital goes on until the society reaches its desired level of capital and output.
One important implication of the neoclassical model is that poorer economies would grow at a more rapid rate than richer economies provided they have access to the same technology. In long run, if all economies have same preferences and technology they will converge to the same level of capital and output. The initial conditions of an economy do not play any role in determining the long-run level of a-uence of an economy. This implication is commonly referred to as the "convergence hypothesis". Subsequent empirical studies have failed to vindicate the convergence hypothesis. However, there is evidence of convergence among the OECD countries. This phenomenon called "club convergence" implies that rates of growth rates of economies with similar levels of a-uence will tend to converge.
One of the common features of most models of growth is that all individuals give the same amount of importance to the future and that weight is assumed to be an exogenously given parameter called the subjective discount factor. Usually it is assumed that the discount factor is less than one, implying that people give less importance to future consumption in comparison to current consumption. One possible economic rationale behind this assumption may be that there is a chance that an agent may not survive to the future period to reap the bene…ts of her current savings. However, assuming the discount factor to be same for all agents requires some careful analysis. Treating the discount factor as an exogenously given parameter, makes the preferences of agents separable over time and hence greatly simpli…es the analysis of their optimal consumption-savings decisions. This technical simplicity comes at a cost of economic plausibility. Uzawa(1968) and Koopmans(1963) …rst introduced the possibility of discount factors to be determined endogenously by allowing the preferences of agents to be recursive. Their approach was extended and studied in greater detail by Epstein(1983) , and Obstfeld(1990) . Both Epstein and Obstfeld assumed the discount factor of agents to be decreasing in the level of consumption. This behavioral assumption regarding the discount factors basically implies that agents become more impatient as they grow richer and their consumption increases. While they acknowledge that there may be equally compelling reasons to believe that people become more patient as they grow richer, they work with this behavior of discount rates as it ensures stability of the steady state equilibrium. They conclude that the long-run level of consumption and output of an economy is unique and independent of the initial conditions, a result very similar to the neoclassical model.
In this paper, we interpret the discount factor as the probability of an agent surviving to the next period. In our model, an individual's probability of surviving to a future period is increasing with her current level of consumption. This has the e¤ect of decreasing the rate of time preference as consumption of an individual rises. 1 Hence, the importance given to the future is in ‡uenced by her endowment of wealth and other productive factors. The main result of our paper is that when the rate of time preference of individuals in an economy is decreasing in the level of consumption the economy may have multiple steady state equilibria. The equilibrium an economy converges to depends on its initial conditions. Two economies with identical preferences and production technology may end up at di¤erent long-run levels of income depending on their initial endowments. An economy which ends up at a low level of income is said to be stuck in a poverty trap. From a purely theoretical standpoint we show that the assumption made by Epstein(1983) , and Obstfeld(1990) regarding the behavior of "discount factor" is only a su¢ cient condition for stability.
We draw the positive relationship between consumption and probability of survival(or decreasing rate of time preference) from two separate strands of literature. On one hand there is a vast literature in development economics which has recorded the e¤ect of malnutrition and undernourishment on the economic behavior of individuals (Deaton(2003) ). Individuals who cannot a¤ord certain subsistence level of consumption are trapped in poverty and save very little. There is evidence in cross-country growth regressions that life expectancy is positively related to growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin(2004, Chapter 12) …nd that countries with higher life-expectancy in 1960 grew faster even after controlling for initial per capita income in 1960.
There is another strand of literature which studies the savings behavior across a cross-section of households. Lawrance(1991) in her study on intertemporal preferences based on U.S. panel data …nds that subjective rate of time preference is about three to …ve percentage points higher for households with lower incomes than those with higher incomes. Controlling for race and education widens this di¤erence even more. Dynan, Skinner & Zeldes(2004) …nd that households with higher level of permanent income have higher savings rates. Ventura(2003) uses survey data collected by Bank of Italy to directly estimate the rate of time preference. He …nds that the degree of patience is increasing in income as well as wealth. In order to simulate our model we also estimate the relationship between adult probability of survival and lagged consumption for a cross-section of countries using non-linear least squares. We …nd that there is a strong positive relationship between the two variables.
These results suggest that the dynamic analysis of an economy where individuals grow more patient with higher levels of consumption is more than just a mere theoretical curiosity. It may provide one possible explanation for the observed heterogeneity in savings behavior across socioeconomic classes within a society as well as across di¤erent societies with di¤erent levels of a-uence. This kind of behavior has signi…cant policy implications. Higher rates of time preference may reduce investment in education and thereby induce a negative relation between time preference and long-run income. Also, poor households will give less importance to the future and have a higher marginal propensity to consume which would adversely a¤ect their savings-investment behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we review the recent literature on poverty traps and highlight the contribution of our paper in this area. Section 2 describes our model and presents our basic results. Results concerning the steady states are presented in section 3. In section 4 we characterize the dynamics of our model. We begin with the local stability properties of the steady state equilibria and then move on to discuss the global dynamics of the model . In section 5 we show that the mechanism generating poverty traps in our model is empirically plausible. We conclude in section 6 with some questions for future research.
Related literature
The empirical evidence over last four to …ve decades overwhelmingly suggests that poorest countries do not catch up with the richest countries and converge in terms of output per capita. Azariadis(1996) in his review article on poverty traps claims that for a theoretical model to be able to explain this kind of phenomenon it must have "nonergodic growth paths that contain several attractors, e.g., steady states, balanced growth paths, or asymptotic distributions of world income". He calls the lowest of these attractors a "poverty trap" or a "low-level development trap."
There is a large literature that tries to explain why poverty traps exist and how that may explain the non convergence in the world income distribution. Azariadis(1996) lists several mechanisms that might generate poverty traps in the standard neoclassical model. The causes of poverty traps listed by Azariadis(1996) can be broadly characterized into three categories: (1) nonconvexities in preferences, (2) increasing returns in the production process and (3) quality-quantity trade-o¤ involved in fertility decisions.
Let us discuss how each of these mechanisms can generate multiple equilibria in a model. Consumer impatience created by non-convexities in preferences such as subsistence consumption or habit formation cause the savings rate to be sensitive to income. 2 In such models, an economy might save very little at low levels of income and be trapped in poverty. It is only after the level of income of an economy crosses a minimum threshold the savings rate increases su¢ ciently to allow the economy to reach a high level of steady state income.
A model with (external) increasing returns to scale in producing consumption goods or in accumulating human capital may also exhibit multiple equilibria. Sorensen(1999) Models with endogenous fertility choice also exhibit multiple growth paths. In these models, individuals typically face a quality-quantity trade-o¤ when deciding on how many children to have. Parents could decide to have large number of children but given their resource constraints it usually means less investment in human capital per child. 3 Alternatively, they could decide to have less number of children and invest more heavily in their human capital. The quality-quantity trade-o¤ could be in ‡uenced by a variety of factors such as income of the parents, the cost of child rearing, child mortality etc. These class of models are able to explain di¤erent stages of human development (see for instance Weil(1999, 2000) ) where the economy passes through di¤erent phases of economic growth and demographic transition. Weil(1999, 2000) call these phases as Malthusian Regime, post Malthusian Regime and Modern Growth Regime. These three regimes represent di¤erent aspects of the quality-quantity trade-o¤ involved in the fertility decision of individuals. In the Malthusian Regime per capita income is low, and with increases in income agents are able to bear the basic cost of rearing more children but they are unable to invest in their human capital or disease prevention. This regime is therefore characterized by almost constant levels of population and per capita income and a positive relationship between per capita income and population growth. In the post Malthusian Regime agents are able to invest more in human capital and disease prevention of their children and it is characterized by positive growth rates of population and per capita income and still a positive relationship between per capita income and population growth. In the Modern Growth Regime the per capita income of individual agents becomes su¢ ciently high for them to make a conscious decision to have less number of children and invest more in their human capital. Human capital accumulation leads to an even higher growth rate of per capita income while the decision to have less children implies a negative population growth. The relationship between per capita income and population growth is negative in this regime. Kalemli-Ozcan(2002) and Lagerlöf(2003) introduce endogenous mortality to show how these three regimes can be generated endogenously in an overlapping generations model. Tamura(2002) shows how these regimes can be generated if there is a transition from agricultural mode of production to an industrial mode. In his model the switch from agricultural production to industrial production occurs when the economy attains a minimum threshold level of human capital.
In this paper we focus on the role of preferences in generating multiple equilibria. In order to highlight our result we deliberately keep our model structure close to the neoclassical model. Instead of introducing a non-convexity in the preferences of economic agents, we endogenize a preference parameter, the "discount factor". We interpret the "discount factor" as the probability of survival function of agents and therefore treat it as an endogenous variable. In a sense, our model provides a micro-foundation for the dependence of savings behavior on income found by Lawrance(1991), Dynan, Skinner & Zeldes (2004), and Ventura(2003) . Since, we do not assume any non-convexity in preferences of agents, there are some interesting policy implications of our model. In section 4, we show how general improvement in health conditions can help in eliminating poverty traps.
The Model
Consider a closed economy in a one-good world. The good can be used for either consumption or investment. The production of this good requires two kinds of inputs, labor(N ) and capital(K). The aggregate production function of the economy in every period is described by
(1)
Our economy consists of a representative agent who seeks to maximize her lifetime welfare. The agent derives her income from selling productive factors in every period. The agent's endowment of labor is assumed to be constant in every period. However, the capital can change over time depending on the savings decision of the agent. The agent, given the initial endowment of capital, has to decide her consumption and savings.
At any period t there is a chance that the agent will not survive to the next period t + 1. The agent's probability of surviving to the next period depends on her current period consumption. When an agent's current period consumption is low (zero) her probability of survival is extremely low( ). As the consumption increases the probability of survival also increases until it reaches an upper bound ( ). The probability of survival from any period t to period t + 1, denoted by t;t+1 is a continuous function of consumption at time t i.e.,
where the function (:) satis…es the following conditions:
(C t ) = where 0 < < < 1. In addition 0 (C t ) > 0 and 00 (C t ) < 0. is assumed to be strictly less than 1 so that the agent's maximization problem has a solution.
is assumed to be strictly greater than 0 to ensure that there exists at least one steady state where the capital stock is positive. The assumption that (:) is increasing and concave ensures that the …rst order conditions for maximum are also su¢ cient. Figure 1 shows the relationship between consumption and the probability of survival.
Suppose the agent has to choose a path of consumption and savings at period 0 to maximize her lifetime welfare. The weight given to future consumption will depend on the agent's probability of surviving to that future date. Let the probability of surviving to period t be denoted by 0;t . These probabilities are the discount factors of the agent in her inter-temporal maximization problem. Let's take note of some properties of the discount factors 0;t which will help in simplifying our analysis in future. (P1) 0;0 = 1, 0;t = (C 0 ) (C 1 ):::::::::
Notice that if probability of survival was an exogenously given parameter say , the discount factor 0;t will be equal to t the same as the discount factor in the Ramsey model. So our model becomes identical to the Ramsey model if the probability of survival is independent of consumption.
Let us now think about the agent's maximization problem. We will assume that the utility of the agent when she is dead is 0. Also, if the agent does not survive she is replaced by an identical o¤spring with her parent's endowment of capital. This means that the economy lives on forever. Let the period utility function of the agent be given by U (C t ). We make the usual monotonicity and concavity assumption regarding the utility function. 
The maximization problem faced by the agent is
subject to the period budget constraints
is the depreciation rate of capital where, 0 < < 1. The Lagrangian for the agent's problem is
The …rst-order conditions for maximum are 4 U (0) = 0 along with the assumption of U 0 (:) > 0 ensures that an agent is not better o¤ dying when she could have enjoyed positive levels of consumption. 
Let e t 0;t = t and
, where t+1 is the present discounted value of future consumption from period t+1 onwards. The …rst order conditions can be re-written as
and
Note that U 00 (C t ) + 00 (C t ) t+1 < 0 since the functions U (:) and (:) are concave. Thus …rst order conditions for maximum are also su¢ cient. Substituting (3) in (4) we get,
The variable t is the present discounted value of utilities from period t onwards. It evolves in the following fashion:
De…nition 1 A perfect foresight equilibrium(PFE) of this economy are sequences fC t g (6) and (7) hold for a given K 0 .
Equation (5) is the inter-temporal budget constraint of the agent. Equation (6) warrants some explanation. In the standard Keynes-Ramsey model the discount factor is assumed to be exogenously given. An equivalent scenario in the context of our model would be when the probability of survival is exogenously given or 0 (C t ) = 0 for any value of C t . Equation (6) would
It tells us that at the optimum, the loss in welfare due to foregoing consumption in period t has to equal the discounted value of gain in welfare from period t + 1 onwards. This condition is commonly referred to as the Fisher equation. However, in our case any change in consumption today alters the probability of survival and hence alters the valuation of all future utilities. Hence the di¤erence between Equation (6) and the Fisher equation in the Keynes-Ramsey model.
Steady-state Equilibria
Let us …rst study the steady state solutions to the di¤erence equations (5), (6), (7). In a steady state (5) and (6) reduce to
We have two equations in two variables: consumption and capital stock. Equation (BC) gives us consumption as a function of capital stock such that they are constant and satisfy the budget constraint. The relationship between consumption and capital stock according to equation (BC) is hump shaped. Consumption is increasing in capital for low values of capital stock when the marginal product of capital is greater than the depreciation rate . Once capital stock reaches the point where its marginal product is equal to the depreciation rate of capital, according to equation (BC) consumption is decreasing in capital. However, without loss of any generality we can restrict our attention to only the positively sloped part of the BC curve.
5 Equation (RR) is the steady state counterpart of the Fisher's inter-temporal optimum. The slope of RR curve in consumption-capital plane is given by
which is always positive from our assumptions. We will soon derive the conditions for the existence of a steady state equilibrium. However, assuming those conditions hold, plotting BC and RR curves on consumption-capital plane shows 5 We cannot have a steady state equilibrium on the downward sloping part of the (BC) curve. To see this consider the (RR) equation. We know that at a steady state
. This slope is positive for low values of capital and becomes negative after capital increases beyond the point where
< 1 which will violate the (RR) equation. that there could be multiple steady state solutions to the agent's problem(see Figure 2) .
We characterize the steady states as two types. A steady state is of type "H" (or SS H ) if the slope of RR curve is greater than BC curve and of type "L" (or SS L ) otherwise. The existence of various kinds of steady states is characterized in a series of lemmas and propositions. The …rst lemma provides us with a bound on the steady state levels of capital. The result follows from the steady state equation (RR) and says that the possible steady state capital levels are bounded within an interval which is determined by the minimum and maximum value of the discount factors. However between these bounds there may be more than one steady state equilibrium. The next proposition characterizes the number and type of such equilibria.
Proposition 1 There exists at least one steady state of type "H". If there exists "n" steady states of type "H", then there must be "(n-1)" steady states of type "L". Proof: See the appendix.
The following lemma provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence of at least one steady state of type "L". Lemma 2 Suppose F K (K; N ) > and let K 1 denote the lowest steady state level of capital. If there exists a K
then there exists at least one steady state of type "L"and two steady states of type "H". Proof: See the appendix.
Lemma 2 provides a su¢ cient condition for the existence of multiple steady state equilibria in our model. For our subsequent analysis we are going to assume that the requirement of lemma 2 is satis…ed and the economy has two steady states of type "H" with an intermediate steady state of type "L". All the interesting qualitative properties of our model can be studied within such a setup. In section 5, we will provide some empirical evidence to show that this condition is likely to be satis…ed.
Dynamics
In this section we look at the stability properties of our model. We begin by studying the local stability properties of the steady states. Subsequently, we will provide a general characterization of the dynamics of our model.
Local equilibria
The stability of the steady states will depend on the behavior of the C, K and around steady state. Log-linearization of the …rst order conditions around steady state yields a system of di¤erence equations in b C t , b t and b K t where '^' denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value. The dynamical system can be expressed as 2
where
and 2 is a weighted average of the elasticity of the period utility function and the discount factor at the steady state. Details of the derivation of equation (8) The local stability properties of the steady states imply that if an economy is endowed with a level of capital stock close to a steady state of type "H" then the economy will converge to that steady state level of capital. In fact the path leading the economy to that steady state is an unique one. However the steady states of type "L" are unstable. So if an economy is at a steady state of type "L" and there is a slight perturbation of it's capital stock the economy will diverge away from this steady state. So where does such an economy …nally end up? To answer this question we need to study the global dynamics of the system.
Global Dynamics and Poverty traps
In order to characterize the global dynamics of our model it will be convenient to write the steady state conditions, equation (BC) and (RR) as just one equation in capital. Substituting (BC) in (RR) we de…ne a new function g(K) as
Notice when g(K) is equal to zero both the steady state conditions are satis…ed. Consequently Figure 3 is the single equation counterpart of Figure 2 . The pair (K p ; K h ) denotes the steady states of type "H"and K u denotes the steady state of type "L". Our next proposition helps us in characterizing the dynamic path followed by an economy depending on the initial level of capital. 
and vice-versa. Proof: See the appendix. Note that when the marginal productivity of initial capital stock exceeds the rate of time preference g(K) is positive. So the economy must be accumulating capital. When the opposite inequality holds g(K) is negative so capital stock must be falling. We can see from Figure 4 if the initial capital stock of the economy(K 0 ) is less than K u the economy will converge to the low level steady state K p . If the initial capital stock of the economy exceeds K u then the economy will converge to the high level steady state K h . This implies that the history of an economy matters. If world economy started with some initial distribution of capital, those countries with initial capital stock K 0 > K u will converge to the high level equilibrium whereas countries with initial endowment K 0 < K u will get sucked into a poverty trap. Hence this In our model the reason for an economy to fall into a poverty trap is di¤erent from other papers in the literature. If an individual is extremely poor, she gives less weight to future and her savings behavior is adversely e¤ected. The economy may be stuck at a low-level equilibrium as a result of perfectly rational inter-temporal decision process. Becker and Mulligan(1997) describe this notion as investment in patience. The population and hence the labor force is assumed to be constant in our economy. Each agent is replaced with an identical o¤spring on her death. An alternative interpretation of our set up is that every individual lives for one period and at the end of that period she leaves behind some bequest. This bequest depends on the importance given to the welfare of the future generations. For individuals who are poor this altruistic motive is weaker and as a result future generations of their dynasty are trapped in poverty.
So far we have assumed that our economy consists of one agent. We have also assumed that the representative agent of our economy is perfectly aware of the impact of her current consumption on the rate of time preference and she internalizes that e¤ect while solving her maximization problem. Perhaps it is worth considering a slightly simpler scenario.Suppose we have an economy consisting of a continuum of identical agents and each agent on their own don't internalize the e¤ect of their current consumption on their rate of time preference. However, the rate of time preference of the overall economy does depend on average consumption of the agents. The following proposition proves that the possibility of multiple steady state equilibria still remains. Moreover, the stability properties of the steady states are also unchanged. Proposition 4 If the agent fails to internalize the e¤ect of consumption on the probability of survival, the possible steady state equilibria to the agent's optimization problem and their local stability properties are una¤ected. Proof: See the appendix.
Let us consider some policy implications of our model. Suppose an economy starts with an endowment of capital less than the threshold level K u . We know that this economy will converge towards the poverty trap equilibrium. In fact, it is a result of perfectly rational behavior on the part economic agents in the economy. Let us try to understand the reason behind this. An economy with an endowment of capital just below the threshold level of capital K u has higher marginal productivity of capital in comparison to an economy with an endowment close to K h . However, the economic agents of a country with endowment less than K u have a lower probability of survival. They do not accumulate capital as they do not expect to live long enough to reap the rewards of their savings. Lower probability of survival makes these agents myopic.
So what can be done to prevent it? The most obvious means would be to provide this economy with additional capital by some international organization such as the World Bank. However, it is possible that the amount of transfer required to prevent this economy from falling into a poverty trap is too large. Suppose instead an international organization such as the World Bank transfers some resources to the government and the government invests those resources for the provision of health services. Investment in health services can be thought of as something that increases the probability of survival for any level of consumption. Let the new probability of survival function be denoted by e (C) where e (C) > (C) for all C. Considering the worst possible scenario suppose that a poverty trap equilibrium still exists(see Figure 5) .
The shift in the probability of survival function causes the g(K) curve to shift upwards. However, this shift is not enough to eliminate the possibility of a poverty trap equilibrium. We can see from Figure 5 that there are still two Figure 5 : Improvement in Probability of Survival stable steady states e K p and e K h which are slightly larger in value in comparison to the two original steady states (K p ; K h ). But interestingly, the unstable steady state e K u < K u . This means that improvement in health services reduces the threshold level of capital needed to induce the economy to move towards the high level steady state. Indeed, if the investment in health services leads to a su¢ ciently large shift in the probability of survival function the poverty trap can be eliminated.
In our model, when there is an improvement in the survival probability the savings rate of the economy increases. This result is slightly di¤erent from Zhang et al.(2003) . In Zhang et al.(2003) when probability of survival is very low any improvement in life-expectancy increases the savings rate. However, when the economy already has a high probability of survival any further reduction in mortality reduces the savings rate. Zhang et al.(2003) use an overlapping-generations model to study the e¤ect of mortality on savings rates, educational investment and growth rate of the economy. In their model, while an increase in the probability of survival increases the desire to save on the part of young agents, it also reduces the possibility of accidental bequests for their o¤springs. Accidental bequests in their model acts as a redistribution mechanism where wealth is transferred from dead to the new generation of young agents. When the probability of survival is already high any further decline in mortality increases the number of old people in the economy who simply consume their accumulated wealth while adversely a¤ecting the savings of the young people because they no longer receive any bequests from their parents. Since we have an in…nite horizon model an increase in probability of survival does not lead to lower savings rate for the economy.
Notice that we have assumed that the population in our economy is constant. 6 One of the implications of this assumption is that life-expectancy and fertility are negatively related in our model. An increase in probability of survival is automatically associated with a decline in the birth rate. We make this assumption to ensure that the economy lives forever. Otherwise the population of the economy will eventually become zero. We deliberately refrain from introducing endogenous population growth in our model. Introducing endogenous fertility choice would require a signi…cantly di¤erent model structure and it is already well known in the literature that models with endogenous population growth might exhibit multiple equilibria(see for instance Azariadis(1996) ). In this paper we wanted to focus exclusively on the role of endogenous probability of survival in determining the rate of time preference of individuals and how that might lead to the possibility of poverty traps.
Are poverty traps plausible?
The reason for the existence of multiple equilibria in our model is that capital accumulation has two competing e¤ects. The …rst e¤ect of capital accumulation is that as an economy saves and accumulates more capital the return from savings become smaller and smaller. Eventually the economy will stop accumulating capital. This e¤ect is present in the standard neoclassical models of growth. In our model capital accumulation has another e¤ect which goes in the opposite direction. With capital accumulation an economy is able to produce more output which results in higher consumption for the individuals in the economy. As the level of consumption increases people have a greater probability of survival which makes them more patient. Patient individuals save more. It will be interesting to check what the data says regarding the magnitude of these competing e¤ects. 7 Are these e¤ects strong enough to generate poverty traps? The possibility of poverty traps depends on behavior of the function g(K). Recall, g(K) was de…ned as
We need to …nd an empirical estimate of the function g(K). Firstly, notice that function F (K; N ) is the aggregate production function of the economy. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the economy given by
where 0 < < 1. We normalize the value of A to 1 to choose the scale of output. To relate our model to the data we normalize population size to unity and write the production function in per capita form as
where y and k are per capita output and capital stock respectively. The marginal product of capital is given by
We use equation (9) to write k = y 1 . This allows us to express g(:) as
Transforming g(:) into a function of per capita output makes it is easier to interpret our results later on. Since y is monotonic in k, qualitatively the function g(:) behaves in a similar manner as g(k). The term [ y 1 + 1 ] is strictly decreasing in y. Recall that the economy will never accumulate capital beyond the point where its marginal product exceeds the depreciation rate. This means that k < k max = 1 1 or y < y max =
1
. It is easy to check that the function (y y 1 ) is strictly increasing in y as long as y 2 [0; y max ).
In order to get an idea about the behavior of the function g(y) we also need to estimate the function (:). We assume that the function governing rate of time preference, (:), is given by
where > 0 is a constant and c t is per capita consumption. (c t ) is the probability of survival function which we assume takes the following functional form:
We estimate the parameters a 0 , a 1 and a 2 from the data by studying the relationship between adult probability of survival and lagged per capita consumption for a cross-section of countries. Estimations of similar nature have been carried out by Preston(1975) and Kalemli-Ozcan(2002). 8 However, there the authors were interested in the relationship between probability of survival and per capita income. The functional form we have assumed for (c t ) ensures that monotonicity and concavity properties of the function (:) that we assumed in section 2 are satis…ed. Note that (0) = = a 0 (1 a 1 ) and = lim ct!1 (c t ) = a 0 . Therefore, = + and = + .
Estimation of the Survival function
Data: For our estimation we only include 98 non-oil exporting countries that are in the sample of Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992). The dependant variable in our cross-country regression is the adult probability of survival. We use the adult survival rate as the dependant variable because agents in our model make their savings and investment decisions based on this. Infant and Child mortality rates are more likely to be important for fertility decisions. We construct the adult probability of survival for each country from the adult death rates reported in the World Bank data set. According to our model the probability of survival into each period depends on past levels of consumption. The explanatory variable in our regression is lagged per capita consumption which we calculate using the consumption share of GDP and per capita GDP reported in Penn World tables. In order to eliminate the impact of business cycles, we average consumption over ten years. For instance, when we estimate the relationship between probability of survival in 1980 and lagged consumption we regress adult probability of survival in 1980 on average per capita consumption between 1970-79 in our cross-country regression. We carry out our regression for three time periods 1980, 1990 and 2000. This way we can check if there has been a signi…cant change in the relationship between survival probabilities and consumption over the last three decades of the twentieth century. It will also enable us to study what our model predicts regarding the possibility of poverty traps over the three decades.
Non-linear Estimation of the Survival function:
The non-linear least squares estimate of equation (11) are reported in Table  1 . Standard errors are in parentheses. 1980 , 1990 and 2000 are the adult Figure 6 show the actual data and the estimated relationship between probability of survival and lagged consumption. In order to check if there has been a signi…cant change in this relationship over the three decades we plot the estimated relationships together in Figure 7 . Figure 7 con…rms what we can glean from our estimation results. While there has been a slight increase in the adult probability of survival over the decades for countries with higher consumption levels, there has been a decline in the probability of survival for the low consumption countries.
Simulation
We now simulate the function g(y). We need to choose three parameters , and . Usually, the value of the discount factor is set around 0.96 in calibration exercises. This ensures an annual interest rate of around 4% when the economy is at steady state. We choose to ensure that is equal to 0.96 i.e., = 0:96 a 0 .
In the production function represents the share of capital in GDP. Following Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992) we …rst set the value of equal to 1=3. We …nd that for each year 1980, 1990 and 2000 there is a unique steady state, i.e., the function g(y) intersects the horizontal axis only once. The implied steady state value of per capita GDP is extremely low. We then increase the value of steadily towards one. We …nd that once the value of goes beyond 0.60 the function g(y) starts exhibiting non-monotonic behavior which is needed for multiple steady state equilibria to exist. What is the intuition behind this? When the value of is very low the marginal product of capital falls very rapidly as y increases. In fact the fall is so rapid that the increase in (y y 1 ) induced by higher y is unable to compensate for it. As the value of goes beyond 0.60 we see that the fall in the marginal product of capital as y increases is su¢ ciently slow so that it is compensated by the increase in the value of function (y y 1 ). The function g(:) starts looking like the way we have drawn it in Figures 3 and 4 . This suggests that if we interpret capital in our model more broadly so as to include both physical and human capital then poverty traps are empirically plausible. Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992) argue that the share of human capital is roughly between 1=3 and 1=2. We choose the share of human capital equal to 2=3. Given that we are now interpreting the capital in our model to include both physical and human capital we choose the value of to be equal to 4%. With these parameter values we calculate the value of steady state equilibria using the estimate of the probability of survival function for 1980, 1990 and 2000. Figure 8 shows the plot of g(y) function based on our estimate of the function (:) over the three time periods.
As we can see for each time period 1980, 1990 and 2000 the estimated function g(y) intersects the horizontal axis at three points. So we have three steady state equilibria. Let us denote the low level steady state by y p , the unstable steady state by y u and the high level steady state by y h . The low level steady state y p are roughly the same for all three periods. y u is the threshold level of y required to be able to converge to the high level steady state. y u is slightly higher in the year 2000 compared to 1980 and 1990. This is driven by the decline in the survival probability of poorer countries in 2000 compared to 1980 and 1990. Not surprisingly, the value of the high level steady state y h has increased over time i.e., y . This re ‡ects the steady increase in survival probabilities of the rich countries. It is more informative to look at the relative values of the low level steady state and the unstable steady state in comparison to the high level one for each of the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. These are reported in Table 2 . These numbers tell us which countries are likely to be stuck in a poverty trap compared to the rich countries in any given year. In 1980, countries with per capita GDP less than 25.6% of that of the rich countries are likely to be attracted towards a poverty trap equilibrium. The number has fallen to 16.95% in 1990 and is 13.06% in 2000. Of course the relative value of the low level steady state in comparison to the high level one has fallen over the years.
Conclusion
The marginal product of capital is higher in economies with low capital stock. It is because of this reason economies with lower capital stock accumulate capital faster in the neoclassical model. In long-run poorer economies catch up with the richer ones. The driving force behind this result is that all economies irrespective of their state of development have the same degree of patience. We argue that it is more plausible that the rate of time preference is dependent on the level of consumption of the individual agents. It is possible for a poor economy to have a high marginal product of capital and show no growth because the individuals don't give enough importance to future welfare. These counteracting forces may give rise to the possibility of multiple steady state equilibria. Unlike the neoclassical model history of an economy plays an important role in the process of development.
In this paper, we provide an alternative interpretation to the term called the "discount factor". The discount factor is embedded in the preferences of individual agents in all dynamic macroeconomic models. We allow the discount factor to be determined endogenously and provide a micro-foundation to its behavior. We also add to the literature due to Epstein(1983) and Obstfeld(1990) and show that increasing rate of time preference is not a necessary condition to ensure the stability of the steady-state equilibrium.
In our model we have made the assumption that the economy is closed and cannot borrow from the international market. If this economy was a small open economy which could borrow any amount of funds at a given world interest rate, then there would be a unique steady state. The arbitrage opportunities would imply that the world interest rate equals domestic rate return on capital. However, if the economy faced any kind of credit rationing then the possibility of multiple steady states would arise again.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to allow the economy to be comprised of heterogeneous individuals in terms of their endowment of capital and study growth related issues in that framework. The endogeneity of time preference might cause the distribution of income to change as an economy embarks on its growth path. Another interesting question for future research would be to quantitatively compare transitional dynamics of our model to the constant rate of time preference model.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: In order for the RR equation to be satis…ed the marginal product of capital can never exceed 1 + 1: This in turn implies that in any steady state equilibria the level of capital has to exceed K from the strict concavity of F (:; N ). A similar argument applies for K.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Along the RR curve as K ! K, C ! 0. From the assumptions made about the functions F (K; N ) and (C) we know that along the RR curve as K ! K; C ! 1. Hence there would exist at least one steady state and that steady state is of type "H". From the nature of the RR curve it follows that there must be one steady state of type "L"between two steady states of type "H".
Proof of Lemma 2:
The existence of a type "H"steady state capital like K 1 follows from Proposition 1.
there is some value of capital for which the RR curve is below the BC curve. Thus there is a steady state of type "L". The assumption of F K (K; N ) > then guarantees the existence of the second steady state of type "H".
Derivation of Equation 8:
Log-linearization of (5) around a steady state yields
where '^' denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value and s 1 = C=K at steady state. From (3), we have
and s 3 = 1 s 2 . We write the above equation more compactly as
where 1 = [s 2 (C) + s 3 (C) ] < 0, from our previous assumptions. From (4) we have
From (7) we get
We rewrite the above equation as
We can now use equations (I)-(V) to write a system of di¤erence equations in b C t , b t and b K t where the dynamical system can be expressed as 2
, and
.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The roots of the polynomial det[M I] = 0, will determine the behavior of the above system. s 1 M 13 = 1 > 0 , if real roots of the polynomial P ( ) exist then they must be positive.
P (1) = 1 1 M 11 + 1 = 1 M 11 < 0. Therefore around SS H there exists one eigenroot 3 which is less than one in absolute value. It is easy to show that the eigenroot 2 will be greater than one. Hence, SS H is a saddle path and the system is locally unique around the steady state. For the second part of the lemma, we split up the analysis of the roots into various cases. Firstly, we note that . Hence the roots will be greater than one in absolute value. Case 3. (Real and repeated roots) The polynomial P ( ) will have real and repeated roots if (M 11 + 1 ) 2 = 4 1 . This implies that M 11 + 1 > 2. Hence the roots will be greater than 1.
So SS L is a source and the system is locally unstable.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We need to show that if marginal product of initial capital stock exceeds the rate of time preference then fK t = K 0 g 1 t=0 and fC t = F (K 0 ; N )
cannot be an optimal path for capital and consumption. Furthermore K 1 > K 0 . Suppose
If we reduce consumption for only one period by x where x is close to zero the resultant loss in utility will be U 0 (C 0 ) + 0 (C 0 ) 1 . The saved amount will provide higher output next period and the discounted value of its utility will be (C 0 cannot be an optimal sequence for capital and consumption respectively and K 1 > K 0 . We can use a similar argument to show that if
then capital must be strictly decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 4:
If the agent does not take into account the e¤ect of current consumption on the probability of survival then the …rst order conditions for an optimum would have to satisfy 
where M . So steady states of type "H" are locally stable and steady states of type "L" are unstable.
